KURDISH: A DIFFERENT LANGUAGE

KURDISH: A DIFFERENT LANGUAGE
Kurdish: A different languageby JOOST LAGENDIJK* Without a doubt, the Kurdish issue is one of the most important political problems in Turkey.The problem is not only a bloody political issue involving the deaths of more than 30,000 people, but at the same time a crisis felt at all the layers of the system from local governments to the Parliament. Although the former policy of the republic, which was founded on the practice of denying Kurds, is about to completely rot, the “Kurdish reality” as articulated by politicians such as Demirel, Özal, Erdoğan and others cannot be said to have been appreciated well enough. The most recent example of this is a decision reached by the Eighth Chamber of the Council of the State on June 14, 2007 to remove the mayor of the Sur district of Diyarbakır, Abdullah Demirbaş, and the members of the municipal council. Endorsing the decision made by the interior minister, the high court ruled in October 2006 that giving information on various municipal services such as culture, art, environment, city cleaning and health in languages other than Turkish is against the Constitution, removing the people in question from office. However, the above-mentioned municipality conducted research and discovered that 24 percent of people spoke Turkish in their daily lives, 72 percent Kurdish, 1 percent Arabic and 3 percent Syrian and Armenian, resulting in the decision to give services in these languages to reach all the people benefiting from them. As a matter of fact, even though one wouldn’t need to conduct a study to find out that the majority of people in Diyarbakır speak Kurdish -- not Turkish -- it turned out a useful one in terms of revealing the exact figures. The Interior Ministry described this decision as a political one and determined that Article 222 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) was violated. The high court agreed with the ministry’s view and also came to the opinion that “a quality has formed that exceeds the exercising of the fundamental rights and liberties defined and secured by the Constitution and international conventions and that is against the purpose and implications of these rules” and decided to remove the mayor from office and depose the municipal council. This decision of the Council of the State indubitably reflects the laws in Turkey and the constitutional realities and also clearly defines the boundaries of Kurdish. While it is a necessity to be respectful toward the decisions of the high court, doing so is giving rise to dismaying results. The mayor and the members of the municipal council will not be able to stand for the elections to be renewed in two months’ time and, what’s more, they will stand trial because they committed a “crime.” The mayor of the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality, Osman Baydemir, is being subjected to a similar set of interrogations and judicial process. Most of these issues taken to court relate to using Kurdish, as was the case with the problematic celebration cards used in 2006 and 2007. These cards, containing nothing more than good wishes for the new year in Turkish, English and Kurdish, were taken by the prosecutor as enough evidence to launch an investigation. The prosecutor, who seems to have spent little time on the indictment, cut it very short and wrote: “It was determined that the suspect used a Kurdish sentence in the celebration card, ‘Sersela We Piroz Be’ (Happy New Year). I, on behalf of the public, demand that he be punished under Article 222/1 of the Turkish Penal Code.” So, it will benefit us to look at this article of the penal code a bit closer. Law on protection of the Turkish alphabet Article 222 of the TCK was put into effect in the 1920s. The young republic, which decided to stop using Arabic letters and write Turkish with the Latin alphabet, made a very radical move in regard to written communication. The scholars who oversaw judicial and religious matters in the society -- and whose command of Arabic was perfect -- were not only divested of their positions in the state with this move, but were also thrust outside the chain of communication between people and the state. Through crash courses on the new alphabet, the founders tried to generate new “elites” and made it an obligation to use the Latin alphabet. This article, as well as the law that obliged the wearing of the felt hat by every male citizen and the ban on wearing the fez and similar “old” clothes outside mosques, bluntly illustrates the purpose of the lawmaker. With this article, the scholars all over Turkey were reduced to invisibility in society. However legally surprising it may be to see this article used against communication in Kurdish, the practice fits with the article’s history and purpose. The Latin alphabet is also used to write Kurdish in Turkey, but it has letters like “î” and “w,” which are not used in Turkish. Legally speaking, the penal code’s article in question should have been directed against using these extra letters, which are not used in Turkish. The prosecutor did not even take the trouble to find a link between this article and the “crime.” According to him, Mayor Baydemir used a Kurdish sentence to celebrate the new year and therefore committed a “crime.” Maybe the prosecutor did not want to delve into details as the English version of the celebration, Happy New Year, also contains the letter “w.” In fact the letter “w” constituting a crime in Kurdish but not in English would be pushing it a little in the legal and political sense.Kurdish still a forbidden languageSimilar things happened and are still happening to Kurdish names. These letters used to write Kurdish names are still not accepted in Turkey, and families are forced to write such names using the Turkish alphabet. The increasingly widespread execution of laws against speaking Kurdish similar to Article 222 in recent years makes the issue politically significant. Human rights defenders perceive this development as a new means of pressure against Kurdish people. In election campaigns, the investigations launched into the use of Kurdish did not produce any results and, to reach voters, the courts that settled the matters defined the use of local tongues as a fundamental right to be exercised and did not see any element of guilt. The newly launched investigations and lawsuits filed give the impression that a political will has come into the play to prevent Kurdish from being spoken as a language of communication. The purpose appears to be the prevention of using Kurdish in communication between institutions and associations. What is feared, perhaps, is that Kurdish may gradually become a normal means of daily communication in provinces like Diyarbakır where the majority of people speak Kurdish.Looking at the matter from a broader perspective tells us that the decisions made by the local government of the Sur district and similar places to use Kurdish as a means of social communication also has a political dimension to it, thus it would be naïve to overlook the fact that the issue goes beyond being merely linguistics. However, the base of the problem is still whether the Kurdish language should be used for communication or not. After issuing a press release, the mayors went into details in their statements and stressed that they would continue using Kurdish whether or not it constituted a crime. The high-tension line in Turkey related to the Kurdish issue is thus laid down. This line is dividing people into two parties based on a question of whether using a simple Kurdish sentence like “Sersela We Piroz Be” means separatism -- therefore constituting a “crime” -- and the opinion that Kurdish is a very normal means of communication in a city comprising predominantly Kurds. There are strong legal grounds supporting our view. As part of reforms made in harmonization with the EU, it has become possible to use “languages other than Turkish,” thanks to a change in Article 26 of the Constitution. These reforms include the right to learn Kurdish and broadcast and publish in this language. If these reforms have any meaning at all, Kurdish should allowed use in Diyarbakır. We see that the mayors, who must be listened to, also put forward strong arguments. The Turkish Law on Municipalities, just as with all democratic countries, charges municipal administrations with being the first to give various information and services, envisaging that people will participate in the decision-making process when it comes to cultural, environmental, health and other local issues. The mayors in return state that to be able to give those services, they must use Kurdish as it is spoken by the majority. They also point out that a certain segment of the population either doesn’t know Turkish at a necessary level or can’t speak it at all. It will probably be beneficial to allow the use of Kurdish in order to reach as much of society as possible for important issues such as, say, cleanliness. We deem it unnecessary to stress once again that the language is indispensable to cultural matters. Moreover, the European Human Rights Bill -- very applicable considering Turkey is a founding member of the European Council -- declares it a fundamental right of individuals to use their mother language and receive information in that language, making it compulsory to respect to this right. As a consequence, we believe it is high time that Turkey starts implementing a truly modern democracy and leave behind the practice of finding an element of guilt in every Kurdish sentence written on a simple celebration card. Unless a line can be drawn between violence and terrorism and the exercising of fundamental rights such as communicating in one’s native tongue, people’s rights and the law will continue being vague concepts. Finding a lasting solution to the Kurdish issue is only possible with the supremacy of rights and law.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------*Cochairman of the Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Commission 28.06.2007

There Must be a limit to hatred

There must be a limit for hatred!

There is a web log called BAYBAK, which claims to inform about the situation in Southern Azerbaijan and defend the Azerbaijani Turks “interests”.
Baybak uses every opportunity to spread lies and fabricated news about Kurdish people in Kurdistan and incite bad feeling against Kurds among its callers.
In a recent dispatch published in today’s Baybak , it criticizes Gooya News why it had republished the news of disbandment of the newspaper “ Sedaye Urmia” and had written the word “Mukryan” after it, [Mukryan is part of Southern Kurdistan which in official Iranian administrative geographical division is part of Western Azerbaijan] as it may imply that “Urmia” may mean “Mukryan in Kurdish”. Then the writer of “Baybak”in utmost insularity sets to attack Kurds without feeling ashamed for his racist approach.
The facts are very simple, A Kurdish news source called “Mukryan” have put up a news item about the possibility of disclosure of the newspaper “Sedaye Urmia”, and Gooya news have added the item to its dispatches
so why make so big fuss about it “Baybak”?

HEJAR

Turkish Paradox:Progressive Islamists VS.Reactionary Secularists

TURKISH PARADOX: PROGRESSIVE ISLAMISTS VS.
REACTIONARY SECULARISTS**

Michael M. Gunter is a Professor of Political Science at Tennessee Technological University. He also teaches at The International University in Vienna, Austria during the summers. His most recent book is The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming).

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded the Modern Republic of Turkey as a secular republic in 1923.[1] Since that time, the Kemalists and military have successfully maintained that a secular Turkey was the only road to progress, reform, and modernization, which today is seen by many Turks as membership in the European Union (EU). The Islamists, on the other hand, have always been painted as reactionary drags on the vision of a modern progressive Turkey. Nevertheless, it has not been easy to dismiss lightly the nation's Islamic heritage.[2] Since the beginnings of multi-party democracy in the elections of 1950, Turkey's Islamic roots have proven important and even decisive in the evolution of Turkish politics. The ruling Democrat Party of Adnan Menderes in the 1950s and the Justice Party of Suleyman Demirel in the 1960s and 1970s both depended on latent Islamic support. What is more, the various Islamic parties headed by Necmettin Erbakan beginning in the 1960s boldly espoused an Islamic agenda. In 1996, Erbakan' Refah Partisi (RP) or Welfare Party briefly even came to power until it was forced to resign by the military's post-modern coup in June 1997.[3] Both the Refah Party and its Fazilet (Virtue) successor were then banned by Turkey's Constitutional Court. However, from the roots of this Islamic debacle, Recep Tayyip Erdogan founded a new moderate successor AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or Justice and Development Party) in August 2001, which swept to victory in November 2002 as Turkey's first majority government since the 1980s.[4] After a brief interlude, Erdogan became prime minister in 2003. The stage was set for a paradoxical switching of roles: Progressive Islamists vs. Reactionary Secularists. Disdaining previous Islamic aversion to the West, Erdogan's AKP committed itself to pursuing Turkish membership in the EU. This, of course, entailed liberal political and economic reforms that challenged the privileged position of the Kemalist secularists and military. The inherent struggle came to a head in April 2007 when the AKP nominated one of its own (Abdullah Gul) to be the new president of Turkey. Since the AKP possessed the necessary majority in the parliament to elect him, Gul's victory seemed a foregone conclusion. The secular opposition, however, seized upon this moment to block what it saw as one of the last bastions of power. On April 13, General Yasar Buyukanit, the Turkish military's chief of staff, called a rare press conference in which he declared that he hoped that the next president would not simply pay lip service to Turkey's secular constitution but genuinely respect it.[5] Then just before midnight on April 27, the military posted on its web site, a so-called e-memorandum (e-muhtira) warning against the threat posed by some groups aiming to destroy Turkey's secular system under the cover of religion.[6] Outgoing secularist president Ahmet Necdet Sezer already had claimed that "since the foundation of the Republic, Turkey's political regime has never been under this much threat" and that "both domestic and foreign forces seek Turkey to become a conservative Islam model."[7] At the same time massive public protests against the AKP and numbering over a million each had already begun in Turkey's major cities of Ankara on April 14, Istanbul on April 29, and Izmir on May 13. Smaller but still impressive ones of over 100,000 each also occurred in Canakkale, Denizli, Marmaris, and Manisa. Pro-secular associations with memberships crowded with retired military officers and brandishing slogans against the AKP, EU, and globalization helped to organize these protests. Secular women's groups were also prominent. The secularist opposition then managed to block Gul's election by simply boycotting the parliamentary election and thus denying that body the necessary two-thirds quorum, a questionable tactic whose constitutionality, however, was quickly upheld by the secularist controlled Constitutional Court.[8] Erdogan was thus forced to call early parliamentary elections to try to break the deadlock. In another web site message, the military urged a "reflex action en masse against these terrorist acts"[9] from the masses. This article will analyze the resulting crisis in Turkish politics between the progressive Islamists and reactionary Secularists. Recep Tayyip ErdoganRecep Tayyip Erdogan was born on February 26, 1954 in Kasimpasa, Istanbul, but spent his childhood in the Black Sea town of Rize, less than 200 miles from his family's ancestral homeland in Georgia. When he was 13, his family returned to Istanbul searching for a better life. As a teenager, Erdogan sold lemonade and sesame buns on the streets of Isbanbul to help his family. He was educated at an Imam Hatip school, Islamic clerical-training institutions ironically made available by the Turkish military after its coup in 1980 in an attempt to preempt leftist and separatist movements. Erdogan also graduated from the Marmara University's Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences where he first met Necmettin Erbakan and earned a degree in management. In his spare time, he played semi-professional football for 16 years. On July 4, 1978 he married Emine Gulbaran who was born in Siirt (Turkey's Kurdish area) but is of Arabic ancestry. They have two sons and two daughters. His wife wears the traditional Islamic headscarf, which has brought negative secularist comment upon him. During the late 1970s, Erdogan worked for the IETT, Istanbul's municipal transport company and became active in Erbakan's National Salvation Party (NSP) or Milli Selamet Partisi. After the military coup in September 1980, the NSP was banned and Erbakan himself briefly brought before a military court. He also served his mandatory military service in 1982 as a commissioned officer. Erdogan reentered politics, when Erbakan founded the Refah (RP) or Welfare Party in 1983. According to M. Hakan Yavuz, the nature of Turkish Islamic politics was already beginning to reflect modern imperatives: "The Islamism of the 1980s differed from the Islamic movements of the 1960s and 1970s in its social basis, nature, and impact. . . . For example, the RP-led Islamic movement shifted from being an anti-global, market-oriented, small merchant and farmer's party to one that demands full integration into the global market and sees a reduce role for the state in the economy."[10] During the local elections of 1985, Erdogan became the chair of the RP branch in Istanbul province and ran unsuccessfully for mayor of the Beyoglu district. He was elected to the Turkish parliament in 1991 when the RP finally managed to cross the 10 percent barrier, but was disqualified by the High Electoral Committee due to technical voting rules. During the elections of March 27, 1994, however, the RP became the largest party in Turkey and Erdogan was elected mayor of Greater Istanbul. It is in this position that he first drew national attention as a populist and effective administrator for helping to reconstruct the teeming city's infrastructure and transportation network without being tainted by the corruption from which so many other Turkish politicians suffered. On the other hand, Erdogan gave fuel to his secularist opponents when he declared that New Year's celebrations were a habit practiced by secularists and not a legitimate cause for him to mark. He also said that he only shook hands with the opposite sex so as not to upset and damage the discussion and that afterwards he prayed to God for forgiveness. Then on December 12, 1997 Erdogan ran afoul of the article in the Turkish penal code that banned "incitement to religious hatred" when he publicly read a poem written originally by the Turkish nationalist theoretician, Ziya Gokalp: "Turkey's mosques will be our barracks, the minarets our bayonets, the domes our helmets, and the faithful our soldiers." For this transgression he was banned from politics and sentenced to 10 months in prison, 4 of which he actually served. It was this criminal conviction that prevented him from immediately becoming the prime minister following the victory of his AKP on November 3, 2002. Erdogan became the leader of AKP when it was established on August 14, 2001 by the more moderate members of the former RP, while the conservatives of the now banned RP created the Saadet Partisi (SP) or Felicity Party. Having apparently learned a lesson from his earlier political experiences, Erdogan specifically declared that the AKP did not have a religious axis and would work within the secular democratic framework.[11] Thus, the concept of Islamists vs. Secularists fails to state what the current crisis fully entails. For one thing, as just noted, the AKP claims that it is not even an Islamic party but rather a new type of party that combines conservative social views with liberal, free market concepts. Increasingly, the AKP has assumed a position as a center-right party, rather than an Islamic one. Some have seen an analogy between the AKP and Europe's post-World War II progressive conservative Christian Democratic parties as well as the modern West's catchall parties. Erdogan repeatedly has stressed that the AKP is committed to democracy and Turkey's secular identity.[12] In power, he has established a can-do reputation of clean government instituting democratic reforms necessary to achieve eventual EU membership. He has successfully endeavored to market Turkey abroad, attract foreign capital, pursue privatization and a liberal market economy, provide necessary services, and initiate a host of political reforms to harmonize Turkish and EU law. Under Erdogan, Turkey has enjoyed an average of 7.5 percent in annual growth, $20 billion in direct foreign investment, an annual export volume of almost $100 billion, an inflation rate below 10 percent, and a record 50,000 plus point high on the Istanbul Stock Exchange.[13] Such stunning economic achievements can be expected to benefit the masses in terms of higher employment opportunities, greater tax revenues, more social spending, and improved educational opportunities, among others. In August 2005, he even admitted that Turkey had a "Kurdish problem" and needed more democracy to solve it.[14] Even his opponents admit that Turkey's economy has done very well under Erdogan. Although further democratization of the Turkish political system is needed, many observers would argue that the secularists actually owe a huge debt of gratitude to Erdogan and the AKP for their reforms that have bolstered secularism within the context of Turkey's cultural heritage. To appreciate how far Erdogan has transformed his original Islamic position it would be useful to compare it with what Necmettin Erbakan, the longtime aging Islamic leader and Erdogan's earlier mentor, is still saying. Unlike Erdogan, Erbakan continues to exude religious paranoia, myopia, and populism and give harangues on supposed Zionist conspiracies, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism, all positions more fitting of the past. No wonder, the secularists try to associate Erdogan with Erbakan. And no wonder Erdogan and his current associates questioned and then left Erbakan to form the AKP. Today the AKP program has transcended its Islamic roots and strongly committed Turkey to pursue its destiny in the EU. AKP's democratic and economic reforms have made it all but impossible to establish an Islamic state. Indeed, history may judge Erdogan to be modern Turkey's most successful leader after only Ataturk himself and the late Turgut Ozal. Who then would be the real Islamists if the AKP is not? Islamic Sufi orders such as the Naqshbandis and Qadiris, of course, would constitute more traditional Islamists,[15] while the Nur (Light) movement of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (1876-1960)[16] and its neo-Nur offshoot headed by Fethullah Gulen[17] would represent more modern scientific Islamic movements. In addition, the Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party) represents the more conservative elements of Erbakan's now defunct Refah Party that was banned in 1998. Erdogan's secular opponents claim that he maintains close relations with these openly Islamic groups and that he has a secret Islamic agenda for Turkey. Fethullah Gulen's movement, for example, has established an international reach including hundreds of schools indoctrinating youths with intensive Islamist training in keeping with the teachings of Said Nursi's Nur movement and a hierarchy of activists in municipalities and businesses. Indeed, the AKP's symbol of an electric light bulb is one that a perceptive observer would recognize as also being part of the Nur movement's symbolism. Although pretending to be moderate, moderate, and apolitical, Gulen was indicted in Turkey in 1999 for his activities, which included footage of him revealing his aspirations for an Islamist Turkey ruled by the sharia and clandestine means to achieve such a goal: "You must move in the arteries of the system, without anyone noticing your existence, until you reach all the power centers. . . until the conditions are ripe. . . . You must wait until such time as you have gotten all the state power."[18] Secularist sources claim that about 30 of the AKP candidates for the July 22 elections are Fethullah Gulen followers (Fethullahcilar). Nevertheless, in May 2006, the AKP government modified the criminal code, and Gulen managed to be acquitted. The secularists also maintain that many AKP members—including Erdogan himself as well as his close associate Abdullah Gul and the speaker of parliament Bulent Arinc, among others—either come from or have been influenced by the Naqshbandi Sufi sect. Indeed, Erdogan gave some fuel to such accusations when as prime minister he supported attempts to criminalize adultery. Earlier, while mayor of Istanbul, he tried to restrict the usage of alcohol in certain public restaurants, while also inspiring a ban on advertisements depicting women in bathing suits on billboards in Istanbul. Indeed, many women were part of the massive demonstrations against the AKP held in April and May 2007, apparently because they perceived that that party might challenge their secular life style. In addition, of course, the wives of almost all the higher-ranking AKP members including famously Erdogan and Gul wear a headscarf, which the secularists despise as an intolerable challenge to their cause. All these measures are seen by secularists as making a clear statement about symbolic control of public space. Zeyno Baran, the director of the Center for Eurasian Policy at The Hudson Institute (a Washington, D.C . think tank) argues, for example, that "Islamism in power creates the cultural conditions for the gradual popular erosion of secularist ideals—which will result in less freedom, especially for women."[19] Thus, conclude the secularists, the AKP acts like any other Islamic party by using democracy in the first stage as a mere means to garner as much power as possible. In the Turkish context this also would imply reducing the military's role as guardian of Turkey's secular state by adopting the criteria required for EU candidacy. Then, once the AKP has accumulated enough power, it will show its true goals and seek to impose Islamic rule in Turkey. Whether or not Erdogan has a secret Islamic agenda is something that only the future will be able to judge definitively. Given the secular democratic reforms AKP has instituted, however, it would be very difficult for it to change to an Islamic agenda. The SecularistsAs with the question of who are the Islamists, that of the Secularists too is open to debate. Historically, Kemalism has been an often flexible doctrine named for modern Turkey's founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Kemalism is said to consist of six principles or arrows: Republicanism, Populism, Secularism, Revolutionism, Nationalism, and Statism. (Revealingly, Democracy is not one of these arrows.) Despite this ideological impreciseness, Kemalism clearly has stood for two basic principles: 1.) separation of state and religion, and 2.) a single Turkish national identity. The first principle clearly opposed the doctrine to any sort of Islamic orientation, while the second came to see any sort of Kurdish identity as a mortal enemy of the Republic's survival.[20] Despite recent theoretical reforms to allow the usage of the Kurdish language, Turkey's highest administrative court, the Council of State, ruled in June 2007 to dismiss Abdullah Demirbas, the mayor of the Sur district of Diyarbakir, because it had voted for the provision of services in languages other than Turkish. (A recent survey by the Sur authorities had found that 72 percent of its population spoke Kurdish while only 24 percent spoke Turkish.) General Yasar Buyukanit, the outspoken Turkish chief of staff, has implicitly opposed Turkey's EU candidacy on the grounds that it is "creating minorities in Turkey."[21] He also implied that the United States too was part of the problem because of its support for the Iraqi Kurds and refusal to uproot the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) sheltering in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq.[22] In addition to these principles, externally, Kemalism opposed any expansionist policies. Ataturk's famous maxim, "Peace at home, peace abroad," aptly expressed this point. (Cyprus and northern Iraq are special cases beyond the scope of the present article, but clearly even these two exceptions exist only for historical reasons seen as impacting on modern Turkey's core domestic survival.) As for the military, it goes without saying that not only is it the ultimate interpreter of what Kemalism is, but also thinks of itself (with it should be added still considerable but declining popular support) as the ultimate guardian of the Turkish state.[23] This is reinforced by the obvious fact that Ataturk himself based his original and ultimate power on his role as the supreme military commander in Turkey's epic War of Independence during the early 1920s. Westerners fail to understand the military's unique role in interpreting and defending Turkish democracy and the resulting contradiction it presents for Turkey's EU candidacy. The military has removed civilian governments four times (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997) and seriously considered yet another coup in 2004.[24] During the first years of the AKP's rule, Turkey's "EU-phoria" prevented the military from confronting it. Once inevitable EU skepticism had set in, however, the military felt strong enough to reassert itself before it had been politically reduced beyond reply. The AKP attempt to appropriate for itself the presidency, one of the last bastions of power still not in its hands, offered the military its final chance. Thus, the current struggle for ultimate power in Turkey may be seen as one more between the AKP and the military, rather than just the secularists. Organizations such as the Turkiye Emekli Subaylar Dernegi (TESUD) or Society of Retired Officers headed by retired Major-General Riza Kucukoglu, as well as the Ataturkcu Dusunce Dernegi (ADD) or Society for Kemalist Thought headed by retired General Sener Eruygur, the former commander of the Gendarmerie, for example, played an important role in galvanizing the massive popular demonstrations against the AFP in April and May. Still this does not do full justice to what is occurring economically and socially. Turkey's phenomenal economic success since the early 1990s has created a new socially conservative Anatolian middle class of urban migrants with strong Islamic roots who have become entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and politicians. Industry too, represented by the Turk Isadamlari ve Sanayiciler Dernegi (TUSIAD) or the Turkish Association of Industrialists and Businessmen (which is dominated by massive holding companies such as Koc, Sabanci, and Eczacibasi) is part of this new mix. This new middle class is represented by the AKP and challenges the long existing privileges of the older Kemalist middle class that largely consisted of civil servants and bureaucrats. Politically, this older Kemalist middle class has been represented by the party Ataturk himself founded back in 1923, the Republican Peoples Party (RPP) or Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP). Since the beginning of two-party politics in Turkey in 1950, the CHP has been largely on the defensive, and despite occasional revivals, slowly losing more and more support. Today Deniz Baykal, who has come to see his party's future closely tied to that of the military rather than its supposed social democratic ideology, heads the CHP.[25] During the AKP's sweep to power in the election of November 2002, the CHP was the only other party that managed to pass the 10 percent threshold and enter parliament, but with less than 20 percent of the overall vote. Although this was actually an improvement over its previous showing that had dropped it out of the parliament in the 1999 election, the CHP proved to be largely an ineffective opposition to the AKP, at least until it managed to block the election of an AKP president in April 2007. In its 2007 election manifesto, the CHP questioned Turkey's EU negotiations because it knew that it would be impossible to maintain a Kemalist state if Turkey joined the EU.[26] Almost desperately, Baykal now declared that "Erdogan speaks with the language of terrorists and supports the view of Barzani."[27] These references were an attempt to paint the AKP as weak on the national security issue because it was unwilling to authorize a large-scale military intervention against the PKK in northern Iraq. Such a position, of course, offered the Kurdish population little in the way of promise. As an unabashed ultra-nationalist party, the Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (MHP) or National Action Party (NAP) also sees the national security issue as its own special domain and ties itself to the fortunes of the military. Presently, Devlet Bahceli, a former economics professor, leads it. Frustrated by Turkey's EU candidacy, which it sees as a conspiracy against the very independence of the state, the MHP also sees the Kurdish issue as one of terrorism and economic marginalization, rather than a struggle for legitimate democratic rights. Theoretical opposites, the CHP and the MHP have established a tacit xenophobic, anti-globalization alliance that accuses the AKP of submitting to the United States and EU[28] as well as having a secret Islamic agenda. Clearly, the AKP has benefited from the incompetence and corruption of the other political parties. The disastrous earthquake in 1999 and the Susurluk scandal in 1996 provide telling examples. Thus, by simply doing its homework and providing the social goodies, the AKP has appeared successful. Almost by default, it is the only mainline party that plausibly has something positive to offer towards dealing intelligently with the economy and minority problems.[29] ConclusionsOn July 22, 2007, the AKP cruised to a landslide victory, securing an unparalleled 46.6 percent of the vote that would allow it to form another majority government. It was the first time in more than a half century that an incumbent government had actually increased its vote. The Turkish people had obviously opted for democratic and market economy reforms as well as for continuing their EU candidacy.[30] On the other hand, they also had voted against inward-looking nationalism, military interference in politics, and ultra-secular fears of a secret Islamic agenda—all characteristics of what many have termed Turkey's "Deep State."[31] Gracious as well as prudent in victory, Erdogan assured his opponents that "there will be no concession on the basic [secular] characteristics of the republic."[32] He also promised to "press ahead with reforms and the economic development that we have been following so far" and to "continue to work with determination to achieve our European Union goal."[33] Although he vowed to continue the fight against the PKK, it now even seemed possible to pursue a political solution to the Kurdish problem and oppose an invasion of northern Iraq.[34] Indeed, the AKP further surprised by winning 52 percent of the vote in Turkey's historic Kurdish areas of the southeast. Despite its impressive victory, however the AKP fell short of the two-thirds parliamentary majority to force through its presidential choice. Indeed, the AKP's seats in parliament actually declined slightly because this time both the CHP and MHP passed the 10 percent threshold to enter parliament. This denied the AKP the extra seats it had taken in the election of 2002. In addition, this time 23 members of the pro-Kurdish Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP) or Democratic Society Party were able to circumvent the 10 percent threshold by winning election as independents. The Turkish president is important because he can hold up parliamentary legislation, chooses members of the high courts and board of higher education, and, possibly more to the point, also must sign off on the highest military appointments. In criticizing the military for past coups such as the one in 1980, few seem to remember the partisan violence that was tearing Turkey apart then or how a badly divided parliament had taken over 100 ballots in a failed attempt to choose a new president.[35] Unless the AKP compromises on its choice for president, therefore, the situation potentially was back to square one when the crisis that had led to the July 22 election in the first place had erupted. This time, however, Erdogan has indicated his willingness to seek consensus from the other parties over the next presidential candidate once the AKP had won the election. Hopefully, his secular and military opponents have also learned some lessons on moderation and respect for the democratic process. If not, further constitutional crises were inevitable. Endnotes[1] A good introductory history is Eric Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 2nd ed. (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997).[2] For background, see Serif Mardin, Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006); and Jenny B. White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002). [3] Michael M. Gunter, "The Silent Coup: The Secularist-Islamist Struggle in Turkey," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 21 (Spring 1998), pp. 1-12.[4] AK in Turkish means white, clean. or honest. [5] "Strong Warning to Erdogan by Secular Establishment," Briefing (Ankara), April 16, 2007, p. 2.[6] See the Turkish military's website: http://www.tsk.mil.tr[7] "Sezer's Farewell Speech: The Republican Regime has Never Been under This Much Threat," Briefing, April 16, 2007, p. 3. [8] Sabrina Tavernise, "Turkish Court Blocks Islamist Candidate," International Herald Tribune, May 2, 2007.[9] "The Text of the General Staff Press Release," Briefing, June 11, 2007, p. 14.[10] M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 213. [11] For background, see Berna Turam, Between Islam and State: The Politics of Engagement (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), especially pp. 134-50; Muammer Kaylan, The Kemalists: Islamic Revival and the Fate of Secular Turkey (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005); and M. Hakan Yavuz, ed., The Emergence of a New Turkey: Islam, Democracy and the AK Parti (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006). [12] "Das Sakulare Gesicht der Turkei Bewahren," Neue Zurcher Zeitung (Zurich), May 18, 2007.[13] Ihsan Dagi, "The Roots of the AK Party's Strength," Today's Zaman, July 12, 2007.[14] "The Sun Also Rises in the South East," Briefing August 15, 2005, pp. 1-2. [15] On the Naqshbandis, see Hamid Algar, "The Naksibendi Order: A Preliminary Survey of Its History and Significance," Studia Islamica 44 (1976), pp. 123-52. Hamid Algar, "The Naksibendi Order in Republican Turkey," Islamic World Report 1, 3 (1996), pp. 51-67; and on both the Qadiris and Naqshbandis, Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structure of Kurdistan (London: Zed Books, 1992), pp. 216-65. [16] On Said Nursi, see Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, pp. 151-78.[17] On Fethullah Gulen, see ibid, pp. 179-205.[18] Cited in Omer Erbil, "Sects, Religious Communities, and the July 22 [Elections]," Milliyet (Istanbul), July 10-14, 2007. [19] Cited in Rod Dreher, "For Turkey, a Clash of Civilizations," Dallas News, July 15, 2007.[20] The Kurdish problem in Turkey is beyond the scope of this article. For a good survey of continuing problems involving the usage of the Kurdish language, however, see Scott Peterson, "Why Turkey's Kurds Are Ever More Edgy," Christian Science Monitor June 29, 2007; and Joost Lagendijk (Co-chair of the Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Commission), "Kurdish: A Different Language," Zaman (Istanbul), June 28, 2007. [21] See Ihsan Dagi, "Is the Military in Favor of EU Accession?" Today's Zaman (Istanbul), April 19, 2007.[22] See Ihsan Dagi, "Ready for an Anti-Western Coup?" Today's Zaman, May 17, 2007.[23] For background, see William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). [24] See the detailed analysis in Walter Posch, "Crisis in Turkey: Just Another Bump on the Road to Europe?" Occasional Paper No. 67 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2007), pp. 18ff. The prominent Turkish journal Nokta was forced to close down in April 2007 after publishing apparent details of the attempted coup. [25] Ihsan Dagi, "To Democratize Turkey, First Democratize the CHP," Today's Zaman, July 9, 2007.[26] Ihsan Dagi, "The CHP and MHP: A Joint Nationalist Foreign Policy Front," Today's Zaman, June 28, 2007.[27] Cited in "Election Campaigns Take a Start," Briefing, June 18, 2007, p. 4. Also see Ihsan Dagi, "The CHP and the Military: What Are They Up To?" Today's Zaman, June 14, 2007.[28] Ihsan Dagi, "A Clash of Foreign Policy Perspectives," Today's Zaman, June 25, 2007. [29] Bulent Kenes, "Minority Test for Parties," Zaman, June 25, 2007.[30] On the ups and downs of Turkey's EU candidacy, see Michael M. Gunter, "Turkey's Floundering EU Candidacy and Its Kurdish Problem," Middle East Policy 14 (Spring 2007), pp. 117-23. [31] For an analysis of this concept, see Michael M. Gunter, "Deep State: The Arcane Parallel State in Turkey," Orient 43 (No. 3; 2006), pp. 334-48.[32] Cited in "AK Party Wins Big Despite All Odds," Today's Zaman, July 24, 2007. [33] Cited in "Turkish PM Vows to Pursue Reform," BBC, July 23, 2007.[34] Ian Traynor, "Turkey Raises Hopes of Peace with Kurds," Guardian (UK), July 25, 2007.[35] On these points, see the military's lucid explanation for its actions in 1980: General Secretariat of the National Security Council, 12 September in Turkey: Before and After (Ankara: Ongun Kardesler Printing House, 1982). In addition, see Mehmet Ali Birand, The General's Coup in Turkey: An Inside Story of 12 September 1980, trans. by M. A. Dikerdem (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987).

TURKEY STEPS BACK FROM IRAQ INVASION AFTER POLL

Turkey steps back from Iraq invasion after poll

Independent
By Nicholas Birch in Istanbul
Published: 24 July 2007

As Turkey's government savoured an overwhelming electoral victory yesterday, regional analysts agreed that the immediate impetus for an invasion of northern Iraq had receded.
Sunday's clear mandate for the Islamic-rooted AKP of the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has been received as a snub to his secularist and nationalist opponents, who put the fight against Kurdish separatist guerrillas across the border at the centre of their failed campaign.
Orhan Miroglu, one of the Kurdish politicians elected to parliament, said the veiled threat of military intervention and a massive military build-up in Turkey's south-east had failed to attract votes.
"Sunday's results are a victory for common sense and civilian democracy over a politics of nationalism and foreign intervention," he said in a telephone interview from the southern port city of Mersin.
With more than 100,000 troops on the border, Turkey's military has been talking about the strategic value of Iraqi operations for months. But it needs parliamentary permission to cross into Iraq. Mr Miroglu, one of 24 deputies to be elected from Turkey's Kurdish nationalist party, says he will oppose an invasion. "We've had enough war," he says.
On the Iraqi side of the border, Murat Karayilan, the military commander of the Kurdish separatist group the PKK, which has been at war with the Turkish state since 1984, is still expecting a fight. "The date of the Turkish offensive has drawn near," he told the Associated Press. "We are ready to defend ourselves." Despite repeated assurances that it will do what is necessary to combat the PKK, the signs are that the victorious Justice and Development Party (AKP) has little enthusiasm for starting a new war.
One of the most striking aspects of it winning 47 per cent of Turkish votes this weekend was the increased support it gained from the south-eastern heartlands of Kurdish nationalism. At least 100 AKP deputies are of Kurdish origin. With unemployment in some Turkish Kurdish towns higher than 50 per cent, they know that war in Iraq is the last thing their constituents want. For a start, much of Turkey's $2.7bn (£1.3bn) trade with Iraqi Kurdistan is in the hands of Turkish Kurds.
A security expert at the Ankara-based International Strategic Research Organisation, Ihsan Bal, was unwilling to rule out the likelihood of small cross-border raids by highly-trained anti-terrorist groups.
Anything bigger would be a sign of government weakness, and the AKP has just been given an overwhelming public mandate. "Soft power is in the ascendant," he said.
How Turkish analysts interpret "soft power" depends on their political allegiances. Umit Ozdag, the author of an unsuccessful attempt last year to take over the leadership of Turkey's newly elected right-wing nationalist party, believes that Turkey should simply impose sanctions on Iraqi Kurds.
Under pressure from the secular establishment, AKP has until now avoided talking directly to the Iraqi Kurdish leader Massud Barzani and the Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd. Faruk Logoglu, whose term as Turkey's ambassador to Washington ended last year, said: "These are the first people we should be talking to about the PKK. I hope the government, now it has its massive new mandate, will have the courage to enter into dialogue with them."

TURKEY RAISES HOPES OF PEACE WITH KURDS

Turkey raises hopes of peace with Kurds
· Poll victory gives Erdogan power to resist military · Kurdish party wins 23 seats in new parliament
Ian Traynor in Istanbul
Tuesday July 24, 2007The Guardian

Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is likely to use his sweeping election victory to open a dialogue with his country's Kurdish insurgents, according to Turkish and Kurdish experts.
He is also expected to oppose an invasion of Kurdish northern Iraq and has invited the Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, to Ankara for talks that would include US officials.
Mr Erdogan is in a strong position to dismiss military pressure for a cross-border crackdown on PKK Kurdish guerrillas based in northern Iraq and to extract concessions on the Kurdish conflict from the Americans and Kurdish leaders.
Turkey has massed tens of thousands of troops on the Iraqi border in recent weeks, with hawks in the high command pressing for an invasion. Mr Erdogan has resisted. Thrust into an unassailable position by a landslide election victory on Sunday, he now looks better placed to push a new political initiative on the Kurdish issue rather than opt for military action.
"Invasion is off the agenda now, there's a new momentum," said Cengiz Candar, a Turkish analyst.
As well as securing a national victory on Sunday, Mr Erdogan scored a remarkable triumph in the Kurdish south-east, doubling the vote of his AKP or Justice and Development party in mainly Kurdish areas to win an absolute majority of the vote with 52%.
"The AKP beat us. The government now has complete power and legitimacy," said a Kurdish official in the regional capital of Diyarbakir.
Having received such a vote of confidence from the Kurds, Mr Erdogan is unlikely to alienate them by invading. The Americans are fiercely opposed to a Turkish incursion into Kurdistan, the only bit of Iraq that is relatively stable and successful.
At the weekend, the British ambassador in Ankara said he could not see what Turkey had to gain from invading northern Iraq. Government officials and diplomats agree.
One former Turkish ambassador said Turkish forces would get bogged down "in a quagmire" in the guerrilla territory of mountainous northern Iraq.
An aide to Mr Erdogan said: "There's been 26 cross-border operations in 30 years. If Turkey had the feeling that a 27th would put an end to the PKK, it would not blink."
In addition to the AKP's electoral success in the Kurdish areas, the main Kurdish party in Turkey, the DTP, took 23 seats, putting it in the new parliament for the first time since 1994. The DTP is seen as the political wing of the PKK. The Turkish election system is stacked against it by setting a 10% national threshold for representation in parliament. The DTP beat the system by running candidates as independents.
"That will make a difference," said Hizsar Ozsoy, a Kurdish analyst in Diyarbakir. "There's definitely a chance for a political opening."
The Erdogan camp has been trying to open political channels to the Kurdish leadership in Iraq for months, but has been stymied by the military top brass and the outgoing hostile president of Turkey.
When Mr Erdogan wanted to invite the Iraqi president and Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani, to Ankara, Turkey's president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, vetoed the move.
In Istanbul and Ankara, the military pressure for an invasion was also seen as a warning to the Erdogan government against dialogue with the Kurdish leadership.
Turkey has been at war with the PKK for 30 years in a conflict that has taken almost 40,000 lives. At least 70 Turkish security forces have been killed this year. Turkey is home to around 15 million Kurds, by far the biggest of the Kurdish populations also native to Iraq, Iran and Syria.
Officially, Turkey does not recognise the regional government of Kurdistan led by Massoud Barzani. But, sources say, there were attempts several months ago to set up a secret meeting between the Turkish foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, and Mr Barzani, who, when leading the Kurdish insurgency against Saddam Hussein, travelled on a Turkish diplomatic passport.
"If there's an improvement in contacts with Kurdistan and with Barzani, that will be good for the Turkish Kurds," said the Kurdish official.
The key to any breakthrough, said the Erdogan aide, was a clear signal on "terrorism" from Mr Barzani.

The Kurdish Question

The American Prospect
The Kurdish Question

Can Turkey learn to live with an increasingly powerful Iraqi Kurdistan across the border?


Madeleine Elfenbein July 16, 2007 web only

The phantom nation of Kurdistan has as long and bloody and proud a history as any Middle Eastern nation -- longer, bloodier, and even prouder, one might say, for it has never had the chance to fail its citizens. It has led its existence as a shadow country hovering over the mountainous region now occupied by Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Armenia. It has had leaders who fought for it, and enemies who tried to destroy it, and millions of would-be citizens, but it has never appeared on official maps of the region.
Instead, throughout the twentieth century the idea of Kurdistan has been used as both a carrot and a stick to manipulate the balance of power in the Middle East, leading to developments that rarely benefited the Kurds themselves. "No friends but the mountains," the Kurdish saying goes.
Soon the landscape may change. A Kurdish state is now emerging in northern Iraq, and the status of the Kurds as a landless, stateless people appears about to shift, perhaps dramatically. For some Kurds, that is. The Kurdistan Regional Government, as it is still somewhat modestly known, controls what are now the only safe parts of Iraq, and more than a third of its oil. Its enthusiasts include not just the roughly four million Kurds living in the region, and the tens of millions of Kurds living outside it, but an increasing number of American politicians and pundits who see Kurdistan's success as the only way left to justify the war in Iraq. The pro-war Thomas Friedman of the New York Times said as much in his recent column on the subject, arguing that a U.S.-supported Kurdish state would at least provide "a decent democratizing example" for the rest of the region.
In return, Iraqi Kurds, to show their gratitude for the U.S. invasion and the realization of their longstanding dream, are offering Americans a fantasy of their own. "Kurdistan -- The Other Iraq," a website and multimedia ad campaign sponsored by the Kurdistan Development Corporation, is designed to attract supporters and investors with promises of a business environment that's "peaceful," "joyful," and has "fewer than 200 U.S. troops." As Jason Motlagh recently reported for TAP Online, the streets are safe and construction is booming. If only Kurdistan were Iraq, the United States could simply declare victory and head home.
And if only the borders of the Kurdish homeland matched those of Iraqi Kurdistan, the entire region could heave a sigh of relief and move on. But Kurdistan isn't Iraq, nor is it the greater Kurdistan so longed for and dreaded. The longing and the fears remain. As Iraqi Kurds prepare to make their new state official and Americans urge them on, Turkey is massing troops along the border, staging threatening "maneuvers," and angrily demanding clarity from the United States about its position on "greater Kurdistan" -- a phrase that hardly ever escapes Turkish lips, although it looms large in the national consciousness.
Turkey is home to some 15 to 20 million people of Kurdish origin, or roughly a quarter of its 70 million citizens. The numbers are hotly disputed, as is the question of how "Kurdish" they are. Although the Kurds were present at the nation's founding 80 years ago and have risen individually to all levels of Turkish society, "the Kurds" as a distinct ethnic group are anathema to Turkey's sense of itself, and the prospect of their political unification is a recurring specter. A Turkish official near the border put it bluntly when he told the New York Times last month, "Now the U.S. has to choose, Turkish people or Kurdish people."
As any honest Anatolian will tell you, Turks and Kurds were once friends -- or, if not friends, neighbors living side by side for centuries under Ottoman rule. In the first decades of the 20th century, they teamed up with the Turks to fight the Russians to the north, and to rid Anatolia of the Armenians. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed in the wake of the First World War, the British drew up the Treaty of Sevres to include plans for a Kurdish state, hoping to win their support for the partitioning of the rest of the empire. But in a triumphal show of pan-Ottoman spirit, General Mustafa Kemal rallied Turks and Kurds alike to fight off the European invaders. A new treaty was drawn up at Lausanne to replace the one made at Sevres and establish the boundaries of a Turkish republic, with Turkish leaders there claiming to represent both Kurds and Turks equally.
No sooner had the British Royal Navy pulled away from Anatolian shores in defeat than Mustafa Kemal (later Ataturk) began the stern work of building a modern, secular and unified nation, with a national identity to match. "Nationalism is our only factor of cohesion," as Prime Minister Ismet Inonu explained in 1925. "At any price, we must Turkify the inhabitants of our land." This involved purging the existing language and culture of Arab, Persian, and Islamic elements, and absorbing or eliminating all trace of a distinct Kurdish identity. To replace what was lost, he offered all his newly minted citizens "Turkishness," an all-encompassing identity that gave the bearer claim to a common history, bloodline and set of enemies.
Thus the Kurds themselves became known as "mountain Turks," and quickly gained a reputation as the most recalcitrant sort of Turk: the sort who refused to call himself one. Turkey's Kurds went underground, but they would not disappear. In its frenzied attempt to create a nation united against all enemies, Turkey created its own worst foe: an impoverished, resentful and alien nation within its own borders.
In every nation in which they found themselves stranded, the Kurds, to varying degrees, looked outside their national borders for solidarity and protection. The treaties of Sevres and Lausanne had taught them the dangers of turning up their noses at imperial collaboration. Instead, Kurdish groups in Turkey, Iraq and elsewhere actively solicited the aid of foreign powers in Europe and the Middle East, as well as the Americans and the Soviets. Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the mid-century Iraqi Kurdish leader and father of Iraqi Kurdistan's current president, Massoud Barzani, eagerly sought an alliance with the United States. In 1973, he famously proposed to make Iraqi Kurdistan a "51st state," an offer President Richard Nixon declined.
Instead, in a well-documented but now forgotten episode from Kissinger's storied years as secretary of state, the Shah of Iran persuaded the United States to support a rebellion of Iraqi Kurds with over a million dollars' worth of arms to destabilize his rival. The U.S. did so, only to abruptly withdraw its support when Iran and Iraq reached a détente. Iraq then launched a vicious campaign of retribution, and the Kurds' pleas for help went ignored. As an anonymous U.S. official told a Congressional committee investigating the incident, "covert action should not be confused with missionary work."
The scenario repeated itself in 1991 when the first President Bush, at war with Iraq, issued a ringing statement calling on Iraqis to "take matters into their own hands" and rise up against Saddam Hussein. The nation's oppressed Shiites and Kurds promptly did so, only to fail once again without support from U.S. troops. The United States finally got around to creating "no-fly zones" in Iraq's north and south, meant to protect the Shiites and Kurds against aerial bombardment and chemical weapons, and established a "green line" demarcating the Kurdish region of Iraq under U.S. protection. The Iraqi Kurds were able to build a de facto state of their own, with a separate elected government, a standing army and even informal embassies in foreign capitals, including Turkey's.
Now, at last, Hussein's defeat and the disintegration of Iraq have opened up the real possibility of a formally autonomous Kurdish nation. Although Iraqi Kurdistan is still not officially independent, plenty of people already behave as if it is. Turkish companies have been eagerly trading with the region for years, and, as Jason Motlagh notes, business over the border has picked up since Hussein's defeat. Even short of formal autonomy, Iraqi Kurdistan's achievements thus far are, in the words of the Kurdish activist Kani Xulam, "monumental." He adds that they cannot help but influence the ambitions of Turkey's Kurds.
Born just outside Diyarbakir, one of the largest cities in southeastern Turkey and a Kurdish capital of sorts, Xulam became an activist on learning that his village had been destroyed in a Turkish military operation. He now heads the D.C.-based American Kurdish Information Network, which seeks to "foster Kurdish-American understanding and friendship." Others in his situation have taken a more militant route, joining up with the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which the United States has deemed a "foreign terrorist organization" and supports Turkey's efforts to root out. For his part, Xulam sees the future of the Kurdish people continuing to depend on the good will of foreign powers, including the United States.
"They call us 'collaborator Kurds,' lackeys of imperialism," Xulam told me. "The so-called progressives in Istanbul, in Cairo, in Beirut who vehemently oppose this idea." He added, "They are clueless. They don't even know what's happened to the Kurds in their name." His experience has taught him not to believe in "some ephemeral solidarity among the peoples of the Middle East against imperialism." As far as he's concerned, only when the Kurds have a strong state of their own can they be friends with their neighbors.
Xulam is one of many Kurds both inside and outside Iraq who cheered the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, even as he regrets the misery that has followed, because, as he says, "no one wants to be dominated." Yet he will not be sad to see Iraq itself dissolve. At a recent televised roundtable on Iraq hosted by Dan Rather, Xulam described it as a country that was "put together by Winston Churchill on March 12, 1921 in Cairo" and has always lacked legitimacy. It is a "diplomatic construct" whose death will not be mourned, in the north, at least.
Similarly, Xulam told me that "the country that Ataturk put together doesn't jive with the country on the ground," leading to many of the same problems. Yet American sympathy for Turkey's national ambitions has always been pronounced, and its sympathy for Turkey's Kurds more limited, in stark contrast to its often oppositional relationship with Iraq and intermittent support for Kurds there. The PKK has alienated potential Western sympathizers, making them appear more like the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka than the Minutemen of Massachusetts. From a practical standpoint, the region inhabited by Turkey's Kurds is lamentably oil-free and minimally developed, in contrast to the far richer land of Iraqi Kurdistan.
Yet the past decade has seen what Xulam describes as "a rising tide of Kurdish nationalism" seeking to overcome existing national boundaries and reshape the Middle East. "In the dominant narrative, the Kurds are hapless, they don't know what they want," he said. But increasingly, they do: "Mind you, there's a difference between a villager and an activist. But it's absurd to say of the villager that he's not interested in his language and is happy to be a Turk. If people in Iraqi Kurdistan can have a semblance of self-government, Turkish Kurds will be jealous, they will be curious, and they will want to emulate" their cousins to the south, he said. "They will want the same for themselves."
Yet given the many differences between Kurds in Turkey and those in Iraq, not everyone expects the triumphs of Iraq's Kurds to change the situation of Kurds elsewhere. "The Kurds are tribal and don't move as a unit," said George Harris, a former State Department official in Turkey and a scholar of the region. In his view, a Kurd living in Turkey is still far more likely to migrate to Istanbul or another city in western Turkey than across the border to Iraqi Kurdistan. He added, "The Iraqi Kurds have limited resources, and they're now enjoying unprecedented prosperity. Why would they want to share that with the Turkish Kurds?"
For the most part, the leaders of Iraqi Kurdistan have displayed a studied silence on the subject. "Iraqi Kurdish leaders are very savvy people," Harris explained. "They've been very careful not to encourage any sort of separatism" in Turkey or anywhere else. President Barzani did recently threaten to "interfere in Diyarbakir's issues" if Turkey did not stop meddling with the Kurds' consolidation of territory in Iraq, particularly the city of Kirkuk, where a sizable Turkoman minority still lives. But Iraqi Kurdistan's website studiously avoids any mention of Kurds living outside its borders. The only map on the site is an extremely vague image of Iraq, indicating the general location of the Kurdish region without defining its borders. So long as Iraqi Kurdistan depends for protection on the United States, which in turn depends on Turkey as one of its "valued allies and friends" in the region, this isn't likely to change.
In light of the unique situation faced by Turkey's ethnic Kurds, and their lack of strategic allies and their greater diffusion within the country itself, their best hope may lie with Turkish leaders themselves. The political calculus that for so long drove them to oppose Kurdish political and cultural representation is shifting fast under their feet, offering ample reason to rethink their approach. In his 1997 essay, "Whither the Kurds?," Harris observed that "some Turkish politicians recognize that a measure of political accommodation with their Kurdish population is desirable" -- to avoid both the complications of a messy domestic situation and the international stigma it carries. Ten years later, their incentive for smoothing things over has only increased. Besides, as Harris notes, and as Turkey's own history suggests, "a purely military response to Kurdish dissidence is bound to fail." After eighty years of struggle and tens of thousands of deaths, Turkey knows it.
The demands of the PKK notwithstanding, what most Turkish Kurds -- or Kurdish Turks -- want most is the right to live free from harassment, to speak, write and broadcast in their native language, and to organize politically as Kurds in order to reap the benefits of Turkish citizenship. Eighty years of living in a democratic state with a fierce nationalist ethos has shaped their loyalties and expectations differently than those of Iraqi Kurds, who by most reports feel little kinship with other Iraqis. Turkish leaders should take advantage of this difference while it lasts. "Pan-Kurdish sentiment is on the rise," Kani Xulam told me, adding, "Our adversaries may not want to admit to this, but they are responsible." In southeastern Turkey, the military checkpoints target Kurds, while in Iraqi Kurdistan, they target Arabs.
Turkey's first priority, understandably, is to "contain" Kurdistan and keep separatism from seeping across its borders. But in Xulam's words, the "revolution of rising expectations" is already underway, and Turkey would be foolish not to try and meet them. Whether they like it or not, geography has thrown Turks and Kurds together for the long haul. It's time for them to start using the same map.


Madeleine Elfenbein is on the editorial staff of The New Yorker

The Iraq Commission and the evidence of Professor Brendan O'Leary

The Foreign Policy Centre (FPC), in partnership with Britain's Channel 4, has facilitated a UK Iraq Commission- the British equivalent of the Us Iraq Study Group [Baker-Hamilton Commission] it is jointly chaired by three veteran British politicians. The commission have had hearings with 49 witnesses including two Representatives of Kurdistan Regional Government on June 2007.
The commission will examine all possible options for Britain's future role in Iraq. It will present its finding to Mr.Gorden Brown and leaders of political parties of UK in mid-July. The following is the transcript of Professor Brendan O'leary's evidence to the commission on Friday, June 15,2007
For further information see the source below
Sayinqella

Dialogue

Margaret Jay

Thank you very much for coming, good morning I'm Margaret Jay and I'm chairing this morning's meeting of the Iraq Commission and if I may briefly introduce my fellow commissioners who are with me here this morning, on my far left Stephen Twigg who's the Director of the Foreign Policy Centre, on my immediate left Professor Brian Brivati from Kingston University, on my right Lord Hannay, who was David Hannay was our Ambassador to the United Nations and on his right Sir Patrick Walker who is an ex-Director of MI5 and we're very grateful to you for coming and for you're very interesting memorandum that you've submitted to us, the title of which of you're memorandum is work for not against Iraq's constitution, quite a lot of the evidence that we've been given in previous session has suggested that a useful way forward would be to amend the 2005 constitution in order to repair some of the problem which seem to have arisen directly as a result of it, why are you so keen that particularly the UK government should be a firm advocate of the existing constitution?

Brendan O'Leary

I think the UK government should be a firm advocate of the existing constitution because it reflects the agreed will of four out of five of Iraq's voters and that the UK Government should support amendments to the constitution within the agreed process of the constitution. The trouble is in Washington and I think reluctantly in parts of the UK diplomatic officialdom there is a desire to overturn the substantial content of the constitution which for practical purposes means the federalist arrangements that were agreed. There is no difficulty in my view in working on matters that do need to be worked on in the constitution, namely the second chamber; the working of the supreme court, there is certainly room for flexibility on issues on de- Baathification. There are even possibilities of room, I think, for a collective presidency in the future rather than a single person presidency, these are well within the spirit and ambit of the general constitution but what I think is simply not negotiable is the fundamental federalist package and that touches on not only the formation of regions but the provisions on natural resources and future security arrangements, those three core things in my view are not capable of being renegotiated.

Margaret Jay

And do you think the existing constitution is sufficiently flexible to allow for the type of political reconciliation between the different sectarian groups which has been one of the obstacles to stable Government at the moment.

Brendan O'Leary

Yeah the constitution achieves something absolutely remarkable that is insufficiently noticed, it basically solves the Kurdish Arab national question for the first time in the history of Iraq no change to the constitution should destabilise that fundamental settlement. The second question you are implicitly erasing is about the internal Arab civil war that is the sectarian conflict, Kurds play no role in that conflict and indeed play a constructive role in trying to mediate it. In my view the constitution provides Sunni Arabs the opportunity for maximum self-Government in areas which there are a majority. The constitution allows them to have a full proportional share in federal institution should they choose to avail themselves of those opportunities. The constitution does not discriminate against their religion, it is endeavour or establish any particular version of Islam, it recognises Iraq's membership of the Arab league which is vital for the Sunni understanding of Iraq's historical formation. So it is completely wrong and erroneous to think that the constitution amounts to a programme against Sunni Arabs. There are other myths, I even heard one of those myths articulated today that the constitution basically deprives Sunni Arabs of access to natural resources because they're deprived of oil in their regions that's not true, there are oil fines in Anbar, very good prospects there and the constitution mandates the distribution of oil revenues across Iraq as a whole on a precapita basis from existing oil fields and the other parties are highly in agreement that the distribution from new oil fields should also go across Iraq as a whole. So I think if you appraise things carefully nothing in the constitution is detrimental to the core interests and preferences of reasonable Sunni Arabs.

Margaret Jay

Brian Brivati.

Brian Brivati

We had negative evidence on the constitution and some positive but both sets of kind of takes on it imply that there is a political impasse now and Ali Allawi yesterday mapped out a way we might get out of that which is to have a form of something like a 19th century congress where all the parties are brought together to make this constitution work, to work out to get the federal project back to the centre to work out which regions would exist and how that would work to use the existing clause to do that, clauses in the constitution to do that, and to underpin that kind of a settlement by bringing in the regional powers who support the different ethnic groups. Now that would entail, as you've implied a big shift in policy in Washington and a shift in London, now our job is to make recommendations to the British Government; if we were to get behind that kind of a project what likelihood of success do you think there would be for that sort of initiative? Or is there another kind of initiative which would get this federal project back into the forefront of Iraqi politics?

Brendan O'Leary

I think on honestly the prospects of that kind of proposal running within Iraq itself, within the elected Government, the federal Government are [as on totally] close to zero. It will sound like an effort on the part of outsiders to dictate Iraq's constitution; Iraq's constitution has already been negotiated. The parties who are in the federal Government are entirely willing to play a role in constructive international conferences dealing with such issues as refugees in which all the neighbouring states have an entirely legitimate interest but they certainly don't want their constitution to be re-negotiated by outsiders and to be re-negotiated by what they seem to regard as the electoral timetables in Washington and in the United Kingdom. So a 19 thCentury model of an imperial kind I think will go down very badly in deed, that does not mean to say there's no role for an international conference but whether of a Dayton style or any other kind, one that appears to have outsiders dictating Iraq's constitution in my view will not fly.

Brian Brivati

Ok so how then do we get, so we the international conference with restricted agenda, how then do we get the federal project back to the forefront?

Brendan O'Leary

I think there it would be very helpful if the United Kingdom Government and the US Government were to shift from their current signals and their current signals are to appear to support major revisions of the constitution which I think frankly are infeasible and if the United Kingdom along with the US, but preferably if the United Kingdom went alone first, were to shift towards recognising what the constitution means which includes a regionalisation of security then a whole series of practical recommendations fall into place. Once you start thinking about regionalisation of security that allows for the withdrawal of the coalition forces from a whole set of areas of Iraq which are functional, not functional in a way that you or I might like in a wonderful liberal democracy, but nevertheless functional and the coalition forces could be deployed to support security locally where that is required, the Kurdistan region security is already established, large parts of the south are stable and functioning. They could be focused instead of having a grand Iraq-wide strategy independently arrived at by outsiders,instead one should follow the security policy of the federal Government and the institutionalised elected governments.

Brian Brivati

So you do think it would be helpful if the British Government shifted,
if the new Prime Minister shifted his position publicly and said…

Brendan O'Leary

It would be…

Brian Brivati

…endorsed in the existing constitution…

Brendan O'Leary

It would be splendid to hear Prime Minister Brown respecting, reflecting and endorsing Iraq's constitution of 2005, he does not have to say it's a perfect document, no one says it's a perfect document there are procedures to revise that constitution they should be follow.

Margaret Jay

David Hannay.

David Hannay

The problem it seems to me about your prescription is that if you regionalise security policy as you're suggesting I can see why that should be very attractive to the Kurd's, I can see why it should be attractive to the Shiite and I can see why it would be extremely unattractive to the Sunni who in any case you wouldn't be regionalising at all because that's where the insurgency is, so it would look as if things have got worse for them, now I wonder if I could ask you….

Brendan O'Leary

To the contrary...

David Hannay

No no hang on…

Brendan O'Leary

No no I don't accept the premise….

David Hannay

Yeah OK could you just let me complete my question?

Brendan O'Leary
Certainly.

David Hannay

Assuming that the Sunni's might have that kind of view what of the elements that you've identified within the federal constitution the development, the organic development of the federal constitution could be put forward which would genuinely address some of the concerns of the Sunni's, even if those concerns are exaggerated what could they be?

Brendan O'Leary

Well first of all let me address the premise of the question you posed. Its not obvious to me that Sunni Arabs have a hostile attitude towards the regionalisation of security, in those governerats in which they have a majority, if they choose to take advantages of provisions in the constitution to convert those governerats into either individual regions or aggregate them to form their own region then they will be entitled legitimately to have their own security. In the interim of course the federal Government has the intuitive in security in those areas, so I think if federalism is properly articulated and properly explained to Sunni Arabs they have the opportunity to protect themselves, they of course have legitimate fears of sectarian placing and sectarian military behaviour against them, they don't talk generally in this way about the Kurds but they do have those fears about Shiite Arabs so regionalisation of security in their areas is of advantage to them in the long run. Now you asked me how can Sunni Arabs be persuaded to see the constitution as reflecting their interest, well they have to learn one thing there's no going back to the old order, the older rack in which they were the dominate community despite being a minority is over, the only way they can have that restored is through either a coo or a successful insurgency that needs to a new revolutionary elite, that's not going to happen. If they accept that position then they can see a whole range of opportunities in the existing institution environment, for example they are regularly reported at the moment to want to have more powers to go to the President because the next President is anticipated to be a Sunni Arab, I think it would be wise for other parties in Iraq to think about that proposal and indeed to think about institutionalising for long run the initial collective Presidency that was agreed in the interim arrangements that's a way of ensuring that each of the three major communities without mandating that they have to be from the three communities, that they each have a stake in the collective Presidency and that's a potential veto power against unreasonable developments. Sunni Arabs have a great deal to benefit from bargaining over the formation of the second chamber, if that second chamber protects the rights of governorates and regions and minorities including religious minorities within Islam, and Sunni Islam is a minority within the Islamic community in Iraq, that's an institution mechanism to where those collective interests can be protected. The organisation of the federal supreme court requires a two-thirds majority of the composition, for that to work effectively that requires the consent of both Iraqi national assembly to agree on its rules of operation and mode of Kurdistan and the Sunni Arabs, so these are intuition which will matter if Iraq's constitution unfolds as it could and these are
institutional opportunities for Sunni Arabs to play a constructive role, one can only hope that they will take advantage of them.

David Hannay

Yeah.

Margaret Jay

Patrick Walker.

Patrick Walker

You've answered one of my questions, but the other one is we've been told that some, well by some people, that they view the new constitution as a beginning of as it were an Islamist state and that the aim of people who want a secular state are not being fulfilled if you like, do you think this is a reasonable interpretation or do you think there is in fact a higher degree of as it were Islamist influence in the constitution than there was previously?

Brendan O'Leary

The United Kingdom has a Monarch who is the head of two established Churches, she's a theological schizophrenic, she's the Head of the Church of Scotland and the Head of the Church of England. Nevertheless there's extensive secularism in the political life of the United Kingdom, in the constitution of Iraq Islam is recognised as the official religion of all Iraqi's, but no version of Islam is establish, the constitution requires the jurisprudence and constitution of Iraq not to operated against the universally agreed tenants of Islam, those are remarkably few and when
you think about the extensive of that provision prevents any one version of Islam being dictated to against others. In addition the constitution federalises the protection of human rights and minority rights because the provisions on human rights and indeed the provisions on religion are not exclusive competences of the federal Government, therefore under Iraq's constitution they are subject to the supremacy of regional law that means that secular Kyrgyzstan will be able to keep its secular preferences going, by contrast if other areas opt for regions they will be able to allow religion to have greater influence over their public law and public programmes, you and I might not like that as liberals, or as secular people but those preferences will reflect local majority preferences. What is remarkable about Iraq is the agreement in other words to regionalise preferences over religion and it seems to me that that is an amicable and sensible way to go forward. Now as for women's rights those rights are formally protected in the federal constitution, those regions that respect the federal constriction in their own regions will ensure that women's rights will be reasonably protected. I think that the secular liberal Arab parties from whom you've heard representation do have legitimate concerns and their appropriate path is to make political arguments for their positions in Iraq.

Patrick Walker

What about the minority of religious groups? How will they be protected?

Brendan O'Leary

The minority religious groups are very well protected in Kurdistan I have reason to know because I've seen the drafts of the minorities in Kurdistan would be very well protected in Kurdistan's regional constitution. On the ground we know that Christian communities particularly in Baghdad have subject to gross and terrible treatment, but formally within the constitution the rights of non-Muslims are fully protected, there's full freedom for their particular communities, in addition there's a regular practise in Iraq of respecting both the marital rights on non-Muslims and their Churches and their Schooling institutions. In a moderately reasonable world I see no reason why this would not go forward.

Patrick Walker

Even in the south?

Brendan O'Leary

Even in the south.

Margaret Jay

Stephen Twigg.

Stephen Twigg

Implicitly I think you've answered the question but just for the record, an earlier witness suggested to us that the emerging Kurdish regional constitution will see the introduction of [Sharia] law in Kurdistan can you clarify that for us?

Brendan O'Leary

That is utterly absurd, I've seen no such draft, the draft Kurdistan constitution does not in any way institutionalise any version on the [Sharia]. The draft constitution of Kurdistan of course by virtue of Kurdistan's agreement to be part of Iraq recognises Iraq's constitution in which Islam is recognised as the official religion of Iraq, but in no other way does the draft constitution of Kurdistan implement anything resembling the [Sharia] and indeed secular people will find their rights better protected in Kurdistan than anywhere else in Iraq.

Stephen Twigg

Thank you.

Margaret Jay

Thank you I think that completes the questions that the Commission has wanted to put to you but you have said you would like to make a concluding statement.

Brendan O'Leary

Yes, one of the items on my memorandum on which I did not receive questions was Kirkuk, Kirkuk is a fundamentally important question its part of the agreement which is in the constitution that in my view settles the conflict between Arab nationalism and Kurdish nationalism,the Kirkuk agreement is of a special importance because its very easy to get the intricacies of the compromise wrong. Because the Kirkuk oil field is part of existing exploited fields it follows that under the constitution of Iraq that even if the Kirkuk governorate does vote to become part of Kurdistan, the oil revenues from Kirkuk governorate will go to Iraq as a whole, so it is false to suggest that the Kurds will simply absorb the oil revenues of Kirkuk oil field.
The negotiators of the constitution separately separated the questions of oil revenues from the territorial status of the Governorate. Secondly, the constitution makes an explicit timetabled commitment to resolving the status of Kirkuk by 2007, there is no provision in the constitution for delaying that referendum, I think it would be very wise to recommend that that referendum go ahead and the constructive way for this Commission to respond to the necessary difficulties and anxieties attached to that referendum is to show concern for the rights of the minorities in Kirkuk Governorate, the best way to address those questions in my view is to encourage the Kurdistan Government in its regional constitution, to make power sharing arrangements and minorities rights protection available within Kirkuk governorate in its constitution for the future. I think its very important that the Commission consider very carefully Turkey's alleged and actual interests in the region, Turkey has legitimate interests flowing from instability in Iraq, it does not however have legitimate interests in determining the internal regional governance boundaries of Iraq, its concerns for the Turkey men can be addressed in the way that I've just suggested and its concerns about the PKK should be met with frank and accurate statements of local circumstances. It is not true that the Kurdistan regional Government supports the platform of the PKK, it has never supported terrorism attacking civilians deliberately for political purposes and it argues that Turkey should seek a peaceful and democratic resolution its own local Kurdish questions. It would be, I think, very very dangerous if either Washington or London were to signal to Turkey that it is appropriate in any way for this Nato partner and possible future EU member to engage in an attack on the territory of a newly established democracy.

David Hannay

Could I just follow that up, I don't at all disagree with your view that it would be very unfortunate to put mildly, disastrous if Turkey became involved territorially in Iraq and I would personally think that it was highly unlikely that either the British or American Governments would give any encouragement to that whatsoever, quite the contrary all the evidence is to the opposite. But there is a legitimate Turkish concern about acting by the PKK in the boarder regions and I wonder whether you could throw some light on why it is that the Kurdish regional Government...

Brendan O'Leary

Kurdistan regional Government.

David Hannay

Kurdish and regional Government cannot give me solid and more credible guarantees about their territory not being used for any of the activities to the PKK than they done hither to.

Brendan O'Leary

Well I think they have given guarantees, they in no way endorse attacks by the PKK on Turkey using the Kurdistan regional Government's territory as its base. The PKK that exists in the KRG region is located in deeply inaccessible mountains, whereon Government, no military Government on earth has yet been able to dislodge any kind of guerrilla force, its not feasible in other words for there to be a successful assault on those guerrilla hideouts, unless the entire Turkish army were to be deployed in a massive siege operation throughout the whole of northern Kurdistan, this is not feasible and it would be a grossly and proper intervention in the affairs of the KRG, what the KRG wants to promote and what I think the United Kingdom Government should promote is a reasonable resolution of the Kurdish question inside Turkey itself, that obviously requires thinking in the way that the
United Kingdom has done imaginatively about how the bring in guerrilla organisations from the cold to settle for things short of what they ultimately aspire to, the United Kingdom has successfully negotiated with the leaders of the IRA, there is no, in my view, fundamental impendent to successful negation between Turkey and leaders of the PKK provided the PKK is prepared to announce a complete sensation of violence which it has shown willingness to do on previous occasions.

David Hannay

Well I if you would allow me to take issue with that the present Turkey Government has introduced a very large number of reforms which are indeed designed to meet the legitimate concerns of the population of Turkey of ethnic Kurdish origin, but those reforms have not been accepted by the PKK, which having been on ceasefire for a long time has reverted to military activities, some of which you yourself are recognising are undoubtedly taking place from safe havens in Kurdistan…

Brendan O'Leary

Safe safe safe haven…

David Hannay

…now there is a it is…

Brendan O'Leary

…is not a…

David Hannay

Honestly if you just let me...

Brendan O'Leary

Lord Hannay safe haven is not a term I'll allow to pass.

David Hannay

No no alright well you…

Brendan O'Leary

Because it implies that the

David Hannay

…you will allow what you like but I'm using it, all I'm saying is that you do not seem to be recognising the fact the PKK does not represent the vast majority of Kurds in Turkey and that the Turkish Government, the present Turkish Government has done a very great deal to meet the concerns of their Kurdish ethnic groups and that it is really very important and there I agree with you to avoid a situation where Turkey feels that it has no alternative but to intervene and it is very important that the Kurds of Iraq help the Turkish Government come to that right conclusion.

Brendan O'Leary

Lord Hannay under the constitution of Turkey it is not possible for a party with the title of Kurdistan or Kurdish to run for elected office, therefore neither you nor I can know the actual levels of support among the Kurdish population in south east Turkey in particular, for Kurdish nationalist parties, I suspect that if there were to be free elections in which a party could run under any label there would be significant support for some sections of the PKK, that I think would be regrettable but I don't doubt that the actual possibility that that would occur. The Turkish Government has shifted from its previous positions, it has improved on paper the rights on Kurds, it has some way to go. Now all that said in my view there is no question the KRG has no interest in destabilising Turkey it has absolutely no interest in encouraging intervention by much militarily superior neighbour on its soil, on the other hand it has its own rights to protect and it will insist on protection of those rights and that will not involve it in any support for terrorism beyond its boarders.

David Hannay

Thank you

Margaret Jay

Thank you very much and may I say how grateful we were for your previous memorandum because that enabled us to focus the discussion and gave us a great deal of background so thank you very much….

Brendan O'Leary

Thank you very much.

Margaret Jay

…Professor O'Leary.

Brendan O'Leary

Thank you.

Source:http://www.channel4.com/news/microsites/l/the_iraq_commission/video.html